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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The proceeding before the Third District Court was an action for breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and bad faith involving Garrett Prince who was 
injured by the Defendant's misconduct (hereinafter "Plaintiff), plaintiff and appellant, 
and State Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Bear River"), defendant 
and appellee, Civil number 9 7 0 9 0 5 6 4 1 . (R. 1). The primary issue presented to the 
district court was whether Bear River owed indemnification to Plaintiff under his 
automobile insurance policies containing personal injury protection coverage ("PIP") 
despite Bear River's claim that some of his incurred medical expenses were "not 
reasonable and necessary." (R. 25). 
Other defendants and plaintiffs were not added to the action before the district 
court because the court refused to permit the complaint to be amended to include class 
certification and inclusion of the insurance doctor as a co-defendant. (R. 485). 
STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 11,1997. (R. 1). On October 1,1997 
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the court to interpret the 
no-fault statute and to rule that Bear River breached its contract by attempting to impose 
conditions, exclusions and limitations which are not authorized by the no-fault statute. 
1 
(R. 20). Plaintiffs motion was supported by affidavits and admissible evidence. (R. 48-
72). Bear River failed to properly dispute any of the admissible facts presented by 
Plaintiff in its opposition memorandum. (R. 86-87). Bear River filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on January 23,1998 alleging that its affirmative defenses and factual 
disputes should be resolved in its favor. (R. 144). Bear River's motion was unsupported 
by any admissible evidence; instead it was "supported" by the conclusory assertions made 
by its insurance doctor and its claims adjuster. (R. 155-163). Judge Thorne made an oral 
ruling in favor of Bear River "for the reasons stated by Bear River" on February 9, 1998 
and the order was entered April 1,1998.1 (R. 189). Plaintiff filed a Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal on April 16,1998 asking that this Court determine that Bear River 
breached its contract by failing to pay PIP benefits when due based upon the subjective 
opinion of an insurance doctor and the phrase "reasonable and necessary." (R. 194). The 
Petition was denied without comment on August 11,1998. (R. 197). 
Plaintiff filed written discovery on January 26, 2000. Bear River brazenly refused 
1
 On or about March 30, 1998, Garrett Prince settled his tort claim against the 
tortfeasor's liability carrier for $26,000.00. In connection with that settlement, Plaintiffs 
counsel negotiated full reimbursement by the tortfeasor's liability carrier to Bear Paver. 
Upon being notified by the third-party carrier that it would reimburse the full $3,000.00 in 
PIP expenses, Bear River's claims adjustor attempted to scuttle the settlement by telling 
the third-party carrier that Plaintiff had failed to overcome the tort threshold as a result of 
her refusal to pay more than $1,900.00 in PIP medical expenses. After the third-party 
carrier consulted a competent attorney, the case was settled in spite of Bear River's 
objections, and a check for $3,000.00 was sent to Bear River. Bear River allegedly paid 
the remainder of Mr. Prince's PIP expenses shortly after receiving assurances of full 
reimbursement from the third-party carrier. 
2 
to respond to any of the discovery based upon its conclusory allegation that the issues 
were "moot." After unsuccessful efforts to obtain cooperation, Plaintiff filed a motion to 
compel on December 15,2000. (R. 434). 
Bear River filed a second unsupported motion for summary judgment on February 
16,2000. (R. 202). Judge Thorne denied Bear River's motion through an order dated 
June 3,2000. On July 25,2000, Bear River filed a motion styled "Motion for 
Determination of Attorney Fees." (R. 239). Bear River asserted that it should be relieved 
of its obligation to provide attorney fees because "Plaintiff had done nothing to pursue its 
breach of contract claim beyond filing the complaint." (R. 247). A Minute Entry was 
signed by Judge Dever on October 3,2000 which adopted Bear River's assertions and 
purported to grant Bear River's "motion." (R. 268). 
Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59 on October 13,2000 objecting to Bear 
River's misstatements and the trial court's adoption of those misstatements and asking the 
court to reverse its prior rulings granting summary judgment to Bear River. (R. 273). 
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to include all parties and all claims injured by 
Bear River's course of conduct under the no-fault statute. (R. 355). On January 12, 
2001, Judge Dever denied Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint, ruled that Bear 
River owed interest, and ruled that Bear River owed attorney fees, and refused to overrule 
the orders entered by Judge Thome. (R. 485). On February 27,2001 Judge Dever 
executed an order awarding costs, and attorney fees for only 3 hours. (R. 528). The 
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 26,2001. (R. 531). 
3 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court err in ruling that an insured person's entitlement to 
PIP benefits is contingent upon the condition precedent or subject to a condition 
subsequent that a previously undisclosed third-party (in this case a doctor retained by the 
PIP carrier) must subjectively deem expenses incurred by the insured person to be 
"reasonable and necessary" and "related" to the accident? Reviewed for correctness. 
Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992); Mills v. Brodv. 929 P.2d 
360, 362 (Utah App. 1996) (explaining that questions of statutory interpretation and the 
interpretation of unambiguous contractual provisions present questions of law, and "in 
reviewing the trial court's decision, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
losing party."). 
B. May a defendant raise the affirmative defense "fairly debatable" for the 
first time in a motion? Reviewed for correctness. See Creekview Apartments v. State 
Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693, 694 (Utah App. 1989); see also Heritage Bank & Trust v. 
Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's unsupported motion for 
partial summary judgment "for the reasons set forth by Bear River"? Reviewed for 
correctness. Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,445 (Utah 1996); 
K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994). 
D. Did the trial court err in ruling that the seven exclusions and 
4 
limitations set forth in the no-fault statute at section 309 were permissibly augmented by 
Bear River's "IME" doctor's disagreement with the treating physician? Reviewed for 
correctness. McCafferv v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990) (explaining that the 
Utah no-fault statute "prevents the insurer from excluding PIP benefits to its insureds 
except in seven narrowly defined situations" set forth in Section 309). 
E. Did the trial court err in ruling that Pennington v. Allstate permits Bear 
River's self-devised medical management exclusion even though this case does not 
involve any allegations that medical expenses were incurred in bad faith? Reviewed for 
correctness. Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) ("If the reason for the rule 
is not present, the rule does not apply."). 
F. Did the trial court err in ruling that Bear River's breach of its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing would be first-party bad faith in the PIP context and that Plaintiff, 
therefore "had no standing"? Reviewed for correctness. Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (explaining that third-party bad faith exists where 
the parties have a confidential relationship and a corresponding duty of trust such as the 
relationship created by the no-fault statute). 
G. Did the trial court err in granting Bear River's motion for summary 
judgment where, instead of being supported by admissible evidence, asserted that it was 
entitled to a summary judgment because it had "no evidence" as a result of conducting no 
discovery? Reviewed for correctness. K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 
1994) (In response to an unsupported motion, the non-moving party may rely on his 
5 
pleadings and "is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.") (citing Rule 56(e) and Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 
1994)): see also Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984); Parrish v. Lavton City 
Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086,1087 (Utah 1975). 
H. Did the trial court err in determining that Bear River's conduct was 
"fairly debatable" where the Defendant did not plead such an affirmative defense and 
where the only evidence and argument presented by the Defendant was a recilation of the 
rule "when a claim is fairly debatable an insurer is entitled to debate it"? Reviewed for 
correctness. See Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693, 694 (Utah 
App. 1989); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461,465 (Utah 1996). 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the 
proper relationship between a PIP carrier and its insured and, based upon the 
inappropriate legal conclusion, refuse to permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint to add 
allegations permitted under Rule 23? Reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Clark v. 
Hansen. 631 P.2d 914,915 (Utah 1981); State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah App. 1994); Wickham v. 
Fisher. 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981); Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 
971 (Utah 1982); Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993); Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367,369 (Utah 1996); Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831 
P.2d 86,92 (Utah 1992); Dixon v. Stoddard. 627 P.2d 83 (Utah 1981); Hjorth v. 
Whittenbure. 241 P.2d 907 (Utah 1952). 
6 
J. Did the trial court err in reducing Prince's attorney fees to three hours 
which would be "sufficient for filing a complaint" where filing a complaint bore no 
relationship to the actual work which was necessary? Reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1998). 
K. Did Bear River misrepresent the procedural and substantive facts to 
Judge Dever when it baldly asserted that Plaintiff had not made any effort to pursue the 
breach of contract claim because interpreting its alleged defense to contractual liability 
(i.e., the terms of the contract) "clearly" did not include its "reasonable and necessary" 
assertions? Reviewed for correctness. Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 
90, U 19, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the 
jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly 
assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in litigation."). 
In interpreting a contract, the court must determine what the parties intended by 
examining the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an 
objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma. 
655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). The cardinal rule is to give effect to the intentions 
of the parties and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the statutory contract itself. 
LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Additionally, a 
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms and provisions, and all of 
its terms should be given effect if possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs paid an insurance premium to 
Defendant Bear River in return for which Defendant Bear River became obligated to 
provide, among other things, personal injury protection ("PIP") conforming to the 
requirements of the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act as set forth at UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 309 {the "no-fault statute"). (R. 48). 
2. Mr. Prince was hurt in an accident, and incurred medical expenses in excess 
of $3,000.00. (R.48). 
3. Bear River paid part of Mr. Prince's PIP medical expenses in the sum of 
$1,921.34 under the PIP coverage portion of Mr. Prince's insurance policy. (R. 48). 
4. Bear River retroactively denied PIP coverage suspended payment of Mr. 
Prince's PIP benefits pending an examination by Stephen P. Marble, M.D. — Bear 
River's "independent" medical examination ("'IME'") doctor. (R. 48). 
5. Mr. Prince obtained his own "IME" from Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. (R. 48). 
6. Dr. Wyman believed that all expenses incurred by Mr. Prince were causally 
related to the accident and that Mr. Prince suffered a permanent injury. (R. 48). 
7. Dr. Marble also believed that all expenses incurred by Mr. Prince were 
causally related to the accident and that Mr. Prince suffered a permanent injury. (R. 48). 
8. Dr. Marble believed, in addition, that Mr. Prince's chiropractic treatments in 
excess of twelve weeks were "not medically necessary" because the treatments were 
merely "palliative" and not "curative" — each treatment session only provided relief from 
8 
pain for approximately two days. (R. 48). 
9. After receiving the report prepared by its doctor, Bear River advised Mr. 
Prince that it would only pay PIP benefits for the first 12 weeks of his chiropractic 
treatment. (R. 48). 
10. The sole basis for Bear River's decision was that it believed its doctor would 
not have prescribed more than 12 weeks of treatment; therefore, Bear River asserted that 
the expenses Mr. Prince incurred were not "reasonable and necessary" and, thus, were 
excluded from coverage. (R.. 48). 
11. Bear River's insurance adjuster advised that its refusal to pay Mr. Prince's 
PIP benefits was based upon its desire to reduce the insurance rates paid by its insureds 
— Bear River's fear is that if it pays expenses that its doctor describes as not "medically 
necessary," the tortfeasor's insurer might argue that those expenses were not "reasonable 
and necessary" and might not reimburse all of Mr. Prince's PIP expenses pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31 A-22-309(6)(a), -(b); therefore, Bear River might suffer a "loss" 
if it paid Mr. Prince's PIP benefits. (R. 70). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The no-fault statute is not horribly complicated: If an insured suffers losses that 
his or her doctor attributes to a covered event, the PIP carrier pays the insured's incurred 
expenses subject only to the reasonable value of the services or accommodations (as 
defined in the Relative Value Study), the $3,000 coverage limit, and the seven 
9 
permissible exclusions. There is nothing else to it. 
Bear River refused to pay PIP benefits when due. Instead, it asserted the existence 
of an exclusion which does not, in fact, exist. It misrepresented the terms of the no-fault 
statute and simply asserted that "reasonable and necessary" is a "recognized standard"2 
which means that its doctor is authorized to interpret its contract and determine its 
obligations. 
The term "necessary" does have meaning. It is part of the proof of loss 
requirement, and that requirement was satisfied by Plaintiffs' presentation of "reasonable 
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" pursuant to Section 309. Plaintiffs' 
doctors affirmed that the medical treatments they prescribed and billed their patients for 
were "necessary." Nothing more is required. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PIP COVERAGE IS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE FOR THE 
INCURRING OF EXPENSES. 
A contract for PIP coverage is a "contract." A contract defines the terms of the 
parties' agreement. When one party alleges that the other party breached the contract, the 
first step involves interpreting the language of the contract. If a party's actions are 
2
 "Note that the no-fault systems in this country are wholly statutory systems. It is 
incumbent upon any practitioner to ascertain the exact language of the statute in effect at 
the pertinent time, as the statute is the primary source of both rights under the plan, and 
the procedures to be followed in obtaining those rights." Couch on Insurance 3d, 
§125:1. 
10 
inconsistent with its contractual obligations, that party has breached its contract. It is 
impossible to determine what the contractual obligations of a party are without reading 
and understanding the actual language of the contract. Bear River's bare assertion that its 
defense which it calls "reasonable and necessary"3 is not relevant to Plaintiffs claim that 
it breached its contract is palpably without merit. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance 
Ctr., 2000 UT 90, % 19,15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law 
in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to 
properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in 
litigation."). 
The relevant facts underlying Bear River's refusal to pay PIP benefits were 
undisputed. The judicial interpretation of statutory provisions poses only questions of 
law, which are reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 
1038 (Utah 1989); Guardian State Bank v. Lambert. 834 P.2d 605, 606-07 (Utah App. 
1992). Nevertheless, Bear River asserted that interpretation of its contract was a question 
of fact, and Judge Thorne agreed because he thought a jury should determine whether 
expenses were "reasonable and necessary."4 (R. 191). 
3
 The duties owed by the parties to the insurance contract are enforced by the 
insurance contract. Contract duties are strictly enforced and are not subject to a standard 
of reasonableness. 
4
 Where broad discretion is granted to a decision-maker, this Court has properly 
employed the "reasonable and necessary" lingo. For example, district courts have broad 
discretion when deciding whether attorney fee awards are for "reasonably necessary" 
attorney services. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). It is 
11 
PIP coverage is a type of "expense policy." See, e ^ , Wulffenstein v. Deseret 
Mutual Benefit Assoc. 611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) ("Throughout the description of 
benefits accorded, references are to types and amounts of charges, not to the cause of 
such expenses."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(5)(a) ("Payment of the benefits 
provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are 
incurred.") (emphasis added) accord Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.. 559 P.2d 958 
(Utah 1977) (explaining that the no-fault statute "should be construed in conformity with 
the fundamental principle[5] of insurance law, that the purpose of insurance is to 
indemnify for losses or damages suffered . . . . " ) . 
Bear River insists, however, that PIP coverage is an illusory promise creating its 
axiomatic that an administrative agency has not only those powers expressly conferred on 
it by statute, but also those powers that are "reasonably necessary" to accomplish its 
designated purposes. See Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 1991). 
And in tort law, an injured person must demonstrate that medical expenses are 
"reasonable and necessary." See Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 
981 (Utah 1993) (noting the foundational evidentiary requirement for compensation in 
tort action is that expenses be reasonable and necessary). 
5
 This fundamental principle, standing alone, is good law. Plaintiff incurred 
expenses and was entitled to indemnification. 
Plaintiff notes, in passing, that the dissent in Jamison was the better-reasoned 
opinion. The majority helped create a "subtle distinction" which, during the past 25 years 
has been stretched into a "gaping loop-hole" through which overreaching insurers now 
drive a truck. The dissent properly stated the correct rule of law which should have 
prevailed: "The legislative design of the statute was to eliminate any valuation proof, e.g., 
were the household services of minimal or great value, and to set a flat rate. The sole 
issue under this statute is whether the party would have performed household services, 
but for the injury. If he would have, he is entitled to the statutory benefit." Id. 
12 
reciprocal obligation6 of indemnification only when its doctor subjectively agrees with all 
of the treating physician's opinions about what treatment was "necessary." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-307(l)(a) provides that injured motorists are entitled 
to recover, from their own insurer, "the reasonable valuef] of all expenses for necessary 
medical" treatment. Id. Bear River simplistically emphasizes the second word 
"reasonable" (while diligently ignoring its status as a defined term), injects8 the 
conjunction "and," and combines them with the eighth word "necessary." It, thus, claims 
that this so-called "recognized standard" (which it refuses to define or explain9) permits it 
to deny payment of PIP benefits to insureds who have incurred medical expenses while 
ignoring its obligation to indemnify its insureds for "all expenses . . . within 30 days." (R. 
132). 
6
 Bear River's analysis would transform it from an insurance company into an 
entity that receives premium payments in exchange for accepting little or no risk. 
7
 "Reasonable value" is a defined term which references the Insurance 
Commissioner's relative value study ("RVS"). Therefore, Bear River's "reasonable and 
necessary" assertions are misleading for that reason alone. 
8
 "We will not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation " 
Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). 
9
 The assertions made by Bear River are essentially "causation" type arguments. 
In tort law, causation is whatever the judicial system deems a sufficient contribution to an 
event such that legal consequences should attach. In contract law, causation is whatever 
the contract defines it to be. One commentator notes that language of causation is simple, 
but it disguises extremely complex and difficult legal questions. See Robert H. Jerry II, 
Understanding Insurance Law. § 67[a] (2d ed. 1996); see also Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15,22-27 (Utah 1986) (reviewing the standards, measures of proof, 
burdens of proof, and procedural safeguards regarding "causation" under the Workers' 
Compensation Act). 
13 
Defendant's emphasis of only certain words in the statute ignores a 
fundamental principle of statutory construction, that "terms of a 
statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a 
piecemeal fashion." 
Business Aviation of South Dakota. Inc. v. Medivest Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 
1994). 
The word "necessary" is not defined10 in the no-fault statute. It can hardly be 
doubted that the word "necessary" is ambiguous. The word must, therefore, be 
interpreted in the light most favorable to coverage11 which means that the only restriction 
on the scope of coverage is that reasonable expenses must be incurred in good faith. 
II. THE WORD "NECESSARY" IS A COLLATERAL 
REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR CONDITION 
CONTAINED IN THE COVERAGE (i.e., RISK) CLAUSE. 
Sometimes legalese is easier to understand than plain language.12 The word 
10
 The word "necessary" cannot be defined as "indispensable" in a remedial 
statute. Fleming v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co.. 38 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D.Pa. 1941). 
"Medically necessary" has been defined by the legislature and administrative agencies in 
many different ways and "utilization reviews" have been regulated. 
11
 This statement is not completely true because the no-fault statute, as a whole, is 
not ambiguous because it clearly and unequivocally requires PIP carriers to pay PIP 
benefits within 30 days of receiving notice that expenses were "incurred." The statement 
is an acceptable generalization of the "ambiguity principle" or the doctrine of "contra 
proferentem" as a retort to Bear River's binary logic and piecemeal statutory analysis 
which consists of nothing more than the comparison of an adjective ("necessary") with its 
antonym ("not necessary"). 
12
 For example, Bear River insists on calling its doctor's conclusion relying on 
"reasonable and necessary" a "recognized standard." Bear River refuses to explain what, 
if anything, "reasonable and necessary" means, and its "clarifying" term "recognized 
standard" is absolutely unintelligible. Plaintiffs are, therefore, forced to fully argue Bear 
River's mere assertions so that the flaws inherent in its analysis can be laid bare. See 
14 
"necessary" is contained in a clause which extends coverage to the insured. In other 
words, it is contained in the clause which defines the amount of the risk which is to be 
transferred to the PIP carrier through the contractual relationship (hereinafter the 
"coverage clause" or "scope of coverage"). 
More precisely, the word "necessary" is either: (a) a coverage term which limits 
the risk transferred by the policy, or (b) a collateral representation, warranty or condition. 
See Couch on Insurance 3d, §101:6. If the word "necessary" were a coverage term, the 
analysis of its use would involve identifying the additional burden which could be placed 
upon the insured and the resulting process's effect on the insured's substantive right of 
indemnification; whereas, if the word "necessary" is a collateral representation, condition 
or warranty, it relates to a subjective representation13 made by the insured which, if 
breached (by the insured's fraud or bad faith), would give rise to a PIP carrier's right to 
attempt to void the underlying insurance contract. 
The word "necessary," unlike the defined term "reasonable value," is a collateral 
representation, warranty or condition which does not limit the coverage14 available to an 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 90, f 19,15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is 
obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to 
act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions 
a party and its counsel make in litigation."). 
13
 See, e.g.. Couch on Insurance 3d, §81:40 (explaining that a subjective 
representation is a promise which is based upon intention or opinion and is not 
susceptible of present knowledge; thus, good faith is the only criterion of truth). 
14
 If "necessary" were intended as a coverage term resulting in a limitation on the 
amount recoverable, it would have been defined by the legislature; otherwise the word 
invites litigation and inefficiency. 
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insured. Rather, it serves as the insured's promise of good faith in connection with 
medical treatment decisions. 
The Court may not permit Bear River to confuse the "coverage" requirement and 
the proof of loss requirement. Certainly, expenses which are "covered" must be 
"necessary" in some sense,15 but that begs the question of the nature of the procedural 
proof of loss requirement. 
In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction 
between a 'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right 
may be established or enforced. This fundamental distinction 
between the loss, in fact, being within coverage, and the manner by 
which the insured goes about establishing this to the insurer's 
satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency 
Couch on Insurance 3d, §193:19 (emphasis added). 
The insured has the substantive right of indemnification for "all expenses" which 
are incurred for "necessary" medical treatment. The proof of loss requirement, which 
must be substantially complied with16 by the insured, exists as a mechanism to establish 
entitlement to the substantive contractual right. 
Substantial performance of the insured's obligation does not entail a jury trial, it 
15
 The Court will consider "each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the 
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. 
Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060,1061-62 (Utah 1981). 
16
 See Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) ("Professor 
Corbin states this rule as follows: * When a contract has been made for an agreed 
exchange of two performances, one of which is to be rendered first, the rendition of this 
one substantially in full is a constructive condition precedent to the duty of the other party 
to render his [or her] part of the exchange.' 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
§700, at 309 (I960)."). 
16 
does not entail changing the opinion of Bear River's agent and advocate (i.e., the 
insurance doctor), and it does not transform the injured motorist into an insurer of his or 
her doctor's practice of medicine in conformity with the post hoc assertions of the 
insurance doctor.17 To the contrary, this Court and the legislature have consistently 
explained that the no-fault statute was intended to eliminate litigation for the minimal 
losses to be paid by the PIP carrier. It is impossible to reconcile the plain statutory 
language, this Court's gloss thereon, and the legislature's expressed intent of "no 
litigation," on one hand, and Bear River's desire for case-by-case litigation, on the other 
hand. 
Instead of mandating jury trials for determining the scope of coverage, the proof of 
loss requirement is set forth in Section 309(5)(b) and requires that the insured provide 
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" (i.e., this answers the 
question: How?). After an insured complies with this proof of loss requirement (i.e., the 
procedure), he or she is then entitled to receive the substantive right18 of payment of "all 
expenses" guaranteed under the contract (i.e., this answers the question: What?), and the 
insurer's reciprocal performance of its contractual duties is required within 30 days (i.e., 
this answers the question: When?). The insurer's only defenses are set forth in Section 
17
 It is not negligence to rely upon the advice of a treating physician. Mikkelsen v. 
Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384,1387 (Utah 1988). Moreover, contributory negligence is not a 
permissible affirmative defense in a contract action. 
18
 At the risk of being repetitious, the substantive right is the PIP carrier's payment 
of all out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., the risk transferred). 
17 
309 (i.e., this answers the question: Unless?). 
Bear River, properly, only requires the proof of loss procedure set forth in Section 
309(5) for initial expenses such as ambulance charges, emergency room charges, and 
initial treatments.19 However, whenever Bear River determines that the expenses incurred 
by its insureds exceed some arbitrary and undisclosed level, it solicits the second opinion 
of an insurance doctor. 
The use of an insurance doctor is not part of the proof of loss requirement. Rather, 
it is Bear River's unilateral and after-the-fact analysis of the insured's out-of-pocket 
expenses under standards extrinsic to the no-fault statute (such as MERCY guidelines). 
Bear River's denial of PIP benefits based upon its insurance doctor's disagreement with 
the medical decisions of the treating physicians and its insurance doctor's interpretation 
of the PIP carrier's legal obligations20 is an "exclusionary" act. 
Bear River does not argue that the Plaintiffs failed to do or provide anything. Bear 
River does not assert that Plaintiffs did something wrong after the claim arose and the risk 
19
 This fact gives rise to estoppel issues. When an insurer pays prior similar 
claims which reasonably induce insureds to assume that such future damages are to be 
reimbursed as PIP benefits and subjected to the same proof, a court may rely upon 
equitable estoppel principles to prevent the insurer from denying or discontinuing 
payments. 
20
 See State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 
(Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses' testimony to which [plaintiff] 
objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the witnesses tie their opinions to the 
requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has established error and that this error should 
have been obvious to the court."). 
18 
attached. Instead, Bear River asserts that its unilateral decision to request an insurance 
doctor's second opinion permitted it to rest on nothing more substantial than the 
inarticulate legal opinions of its insurance doctor and, thereby, to limit its contractual 
liability. See United States Fidelitv & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) 
(explaining that a clause operates as an exclusion if it purports to reduce an insurer's 
contractual liability). 
In order for Bear River to be permitted to deny or discontinue payment of PIP 
benefits based upon the second opinion of its insurance doctors, Bear River must be 
endowed with such a right pursuant to a clear and explicit "exclusion, condition or 
limitation" in addition to the seven which the legislature has provided in Section 309 (and 
which the legislature limited by using the word "only"). It should be obvious that the 
word "necessary" contained in the coverage clause cannot be decontextualized and 
exported into an exclusionary clause in the absence of legislative action. Nevertheless, 
that is exactly what Bear River acknowledges that it does. 
Because the physician's treatment decisions are not attributable to the insured,21 if 
the treating physician committed fraud or, according to the insurance doctor, made some 
21
 See Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998) 
(explaining that "'[i]t would be 'patently unfair' to allow the insurer to avoid its 
obligations under the policy on the basis of information that the applicant did not know, 
or alternatively, did not fully understand.'") (citations omitted). 
19 
other "mistake" (in the absence of proof— not speculative fear — of collusion22), such 
fraud or mistake cannot constitute the insured's violation of his or her subjective 
representation that medical treatments would be "necessary." Therefore, the only 
justification for an insurer's denial of PIP benefits or delay of payment beyond 30 days is 
a PIP carrier's allegation and proof23 that the insured violated his or her representation by 
obtaining medical treatment in bad faith. A second opinion expressed by an insurance 
doctor does not have any tendency to show that the insured violated his or her 
representation of good faith. On the other hand, a PIP carrier's reliance upon the legal 
opinion of an insurance doctor is conclusive proof that the insurer breached its contract 
and that it did not investigate, analyze or act rationally (i.e., that it acted in bad faith). 
The acknowledgment that "necessary" is not a coverage term (but rather, that it is 
a collateral representation, warranty or condition) gives effect to the word and harmonizes 
each and every element of the no-fault statute. It is consistent with the ambiguity 
principle. It advances the legislative intent that PIP benefits provide prompt and efficient 
reimbursement for minimal losses. It does not render the 30-day payment provision 
22
 Bear River, "by this argument suggests that protecting an insurer from possible . 
.. collusion outweighs the legislative mandate to provide mandatory protection for 
victims of automobile accidents. We do not agree." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call 
712 P.2d231,235-36 (Utah 1985). 
23
 An insurer who wishes to debate "fairly debatable" arguments is required to 
debate them "in court" or lose its affirmative defense. It is not proper to misrepresent the 
terms of the contract, issue naked rejections of coverage, employ intimidating claims 
practices, and still profess entitlement to a "fair debate." 
20 
meaningless. It does not render the "proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" 
language meaningless. It acknowledges the professed fears of insurers that they may be 
subjected to "fraud" or "bad faith" and does not eliminate those valid defenses. It does 
not render the no-fault statute's promise of coverage illusory. And it does not permit 
Bear River to receive an unconscionable windfall of millions of dollars per year. 
III. BEAR RIVER'S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFFS WAS 
TRIGGERED AT THE TIME IT LEARNED THAT EXPENSES 
HAD BEEN "INCURRED." 
The level of proof necessary to demonstrate an insured's entitlement to receive PIP 
benefits is "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the 
period." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(b). This Court must note that the insured is 
not required to prove that the expenses were "related to" the covered accident or that the 
expenses incurred were also "reasonable and necessary." The legislature omitted these 
terms advisedly. Requiring preponderance-of-the-evidence-type-proof of "causation" or 
"reasonableness and necessity" to determine the amount of PIP benefits to which an 
insured is entitled would defy the policy purposes of the no-fault statute which is . 
"prompt" and "efficient" payment of PIP benefits on a "monthly [basis] so that claimants 
can continue to meet basic living expenses." Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos., 842 
P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). An insurance system partially supplanted24 the common law tort 
24
 Utah's no-fault statute has been described as a "partial tort exemption" statute 
while other states have adopted "true no-fault" and still others have adopted "add-on" 
statutes. These fundamental distinctions are lost on Bear River which initiated its 
21 
system. This insurance system is designed to partially avoid25 the costs and difficulties 
inherent in the tort system26 and to direct scarce resources toward healing injured 
motorists rather than paying scarce funds to lawyers and insurance doctors. 
The trigger for PIP coverage is most analogous to "litigation coverage"27 or what is 
frequently referred to as the duty to defend. Neither coverage creates an adversarial 
"medical management" techniques nationwide with reference to its potential windfall 
rather than investigating the requirements of the different statutes in different states. 
25
 The no-fault statute provides partial tort immunity subject to the no-fault 
threshold. This is not unlike previous versions of the workers' compensation act. See 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) 
(explaining that the parties' competing interests were balanced by the legislative 
enactment of a two-tiered payment system requiring a "definite limitation of $1,283.38 as 
the maximum award for any 'ordinary' case" and "vests the commission with continuing 
supervision and control, which can be invoked as either party may find it necessary, to 
make determinations as to the causal relationship, necessity, reasonableness and justice 
of any extended award."). Under the no-fault statute, by contrast, the legislature left tort 
law to deal with "extended awards" and created PIP benefits to deal with "ordinary" 
cases. 
26
 PIP coverage "is based upon contract rather than tort principles." King v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (quoting In re Spera, 713 P.2d 1155, 
1156 (Wyo. 1986) (interpreting the workers' compensation act)). 
Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be 
denied benefits unless a provision in the statutory contract 
between the [insured motorist], the state, and the [PIP carrier] 
explicitly suspends the benefits. 
Id; see also Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) ("Public 
policy requires that persons purchasing [no-fault] policies are entitled to be informed, in 
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially exclusionary terms."). 
27
 Liability coverage and litigation coverage are usually lumped together for 
purposes of assessing premiums, but they are analytically distinct coverages. 
22 
relationship; instead, they are geared toward serving the insured.28 The duty to defend 
requires the insurer to pay attorneys enormous sums of money on behalf of its insured 
"even if the allegations in a suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent." Deseret Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Assoc, v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986). 
In other words, the trigger is the filing of a lawsuit by an adversary against the insured. 
The liability carrier's defense obligation is triggered by the whim of the enemy. In 
contrast, the PIP carrier's obligations are triggered by the treatments and medical 
decisions of a physician who (like the PIP carrier itself) owes the highest duties good 
faith29 to the injured insured. 
Of course, a liability carrier may not obtain an Independent Legal Examination 
28
 The flow of the benefits would lead most people to agree that the duty to defend 
is a "first-party" coverage and liability coverage is a "third-party" coverage. Bad faith in 
connection both types of coverage is undoubtedly "third-party" bad faith. This is true 
even though both types of coverage arise out of "first-party" contracts (otherwise the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing does not exist). PIP coverage possesses elements of "first-
party" coverage and "third-party" coverage. Its overall structure gives rise to a cause of 
action against the other party to the "first-party" contract for "third-party" bad faith. 
29
 Justice Cardozo's famous statement is relevant at this point: "Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden 
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of 
the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending 
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of 
particular circumstances. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a 
level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by a 
judgment of this court." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
23 
("I.L.E.")30 from some shill-with-a-law-degree who obediently determines that the 
claimant's allegations are invalid and, thereby, escape its duty to defend. This is true 
because the insurer "stands in the shoes" of the insured. This is also true because 
timeliness is the essence of the bargain between the parties. A PIP carrier's obligations 
are similarly unaffected by predictable opinions peddled by insurance doctors. 
The purpose of litigation coverage is to provide legal representation when it is 
needed in order to avoid default. The essence of PIP coverage is also timeliness.31 The 
PIP carrier "stands in the shoes" of the insured and must pay the expenses incurred by the 
insured and owed to third parties.32 PIP benefits are intended to provide compensation to 
insureds "when they need it." Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:1 (explaining that no-fault 
systems were adopted nationwide because although the tort system is capable of 
providing compensation,33 it is incapable of providing timely compensation). 
30
 "A person cannot avoid liability for the non-performance of its obligations by 
placing such performance beyond his control by his own voluntary act." Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977). 
31
 See Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992) ("PIP 
benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses 
and actual loss of earnings incurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a 
lawsuit. Unlike an award of damages based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are 
paid monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses.") 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
32
 For these reasons, among others, the relationship between a PIP carrier and its 
insured is based upon trust and is fiduciary in nature. Were it not so, the absurd 
procedure pursued by Pennington against his treating physicians would be proper. 
33
 Bear River appears to believe that PIP benefits are "damages." PIP benefits are 
not "damages." See Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980) 
24 
Utah's no-fault statute requires that "all expenses" be paid within thirty (30) days 
of receiving "reasonable proof of. . . expenses incurred." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 31 A-22-309(5). Bear River ignores the 30-day period rendering it of no effect. A 
prominent commentator on insurance law has described the "reasonable proof standard 
in connection with the 30-day payment requirement: 
Where a statute requires payment within 30 days after receipt of 
reasonable proof of loss and amount of expenses, it has been held 
that an automobile insurer could not require an insured to submit all 
supporting medical records before the 30-day time period for 
payment of personal injury protection benefits began to run by where 
defining "reasonable proof of claim" to include all supporting 
medical records would allow the insurer to have unilateral power 
to determine reasonable proof of loss thereby circumventing the 
insurer's obligation to pay within 30 days and obliterating the 
period. 
Couch on Insurance 3d § 189:64 at pp. 189-75, 76. Bear River may not "obliterate" the 
legislative intent underlying the no-fault statute by hiring insurance doctors and chanting 
the incomprehensible phrase "reasonable and necessary." 
(explaining that "the compensation provided for in the [workers' compensation] act is in 
no sense to be considered as damages for the injured employee" rather it "arises out of the 
relation existing between employer and employee."). However, it is much easier to 
collect damages than it would be to collect PIP benefits under Bear River's so-called 
"reasonable and necessary" test. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1985); Promax Dev. Corp. v. Maxon. 943 P.2d 247 
(Utah App. 1997) (explaining that, because it is the wrongdoer rather than the injured 
party who should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages, the 
standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for 
proving the fact of damages. Rather, to prove the amount of damages, the evidence must 
rise above speculation and provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, 
estimate of damages). 
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IV. BEAR RIVER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT BY REFUSING TO 
PROVIDE PIP BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF WHEN DUE. 
Judge Thome originally ruled that Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract was "a 
question of fact" and denied Plaintiffs motion.34 (R. 189). He based this ruling on Bear 
River's assertion that a jury needed to determine whether expenses were "reasonable and 
necessary" because it obtained the second opinion from its insurance doctor, and that 
Plaintiff bore the burden of proof.35 (R. 191). While Judge Dever failed to provide any 
legal terminology when ordering the Judgment entered against Bear River, his conclusion 
that Plaintiff was entitled to costs, interest, and attorney fees plainly implies that he found 
that Bear River breached its contract by not paying PIP benefits when due. (R. 528). 
This Court must first affirm Judge Dever's finding that Bear River breached its 
contract.36 Judge Thome's Order found that there was a contract, that Plaintiff performed, 
34
 In the Order prepared by Bear River's counsel denying Plaintiffs motion for 
partial summary judgment dated April 1,1998, it is acknowledged that Plaintiff moved 
for a summary judgment that Bear River's refusal to pay PIP benefits when due 
constituted "breach of contract." (R. 190). However, Bear River's counsel later claimed 
that Plaintiff had "done nothing to pursue its [sic] cause of action for breach of contract in 
the present case." (R. 247). The court adopted the misrepresentation of Bear River's 
counsel. (R. 268). 
35
 If Plaintiff bore the burden of proof, such burden would be imposed by a clause 
in the nature of a condition precedent. But see S&G. Inc. v. Intermountain Power 
Agency. 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) ("S&G's argument does not withstand scrutiny. The 
change order could not have created a condition precedent to a claim that had accrued ten 
months earlier."); Hertz v. Nordic Ltd. Inc.. 761 P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (stating 
"no one can avail himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has 
himself occasioned its non-performance"). 
36
 "The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, 
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that Bear River refused to perform, and that Plaintiff suffered damages. (R. 190). It 
found, however, that Bear River's non-performance was not a "breach" because it was 
justified by its insurance doctor's opinion. Id. However, because Bear River's non-
performance was not justified by its bare reliance on the inadmissible37 legal opinion of 
the insurance doctor where no statutory provision provides for such non-performance, 
Bear River's refusal to pay within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of the fact and 
amount of expenses incurred was the breach of its contract. Judge Thome's Order must 
be reversed. 
V. BEAR RIVER FAILED TO PLEAD THE AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE OF "FAIRLY DEBATABLE." 
Defendant argued, and Judge Thome ruled, that Bear River's refusal to pay Mr. 
and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, f 10,416 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 
37
 Bear River's unflinching assertions relating to the opinion of its insurance 
doctor resemble parol evidence. "This court has held that as a principle of contract 
interpretation, the parol evidence rule has only a narrow application. Hall v. Process 
Instruments & Control 890 P.2d 1024,1026 (Utah 1995) (citing Union Bank v. Swenson. 
707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)). Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence of 
invalidating causes such as fraud or illegality, to exclude evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. Hall. 890 P.2d at 1026. Of 
course, "no parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a writing until 
by process of interpretation it is determined what the writing means." 3 Arthur L. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts § 579, at 412 (1960) [hereinafter Corbin ]. Accordingly, we have 
held that a court may consider extrinsic evidence if the meaning of the contract is 
ambiguous or uncertain. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104,108 (Utah 1991) (citing 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292,1293 (Utah 1983)): see also Hall 890 P.2d at 
1026-27 (citing Colonial Leasing Co. of New England. Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr.. 731 
P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986))." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1995). 
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Prince's PIP benefits within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount 
of expenses incurred was "fairly debatable," thus a bad-faith cause of action did not lie. 
(R. 192). Pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an affirmative 
defense includes any matter "constituting an avoidance." Defendant asserts that its 
"fairly debatable" defense suggests "new and independent reason[s] why [Mr. Prince] 
may not assert a claim." Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693, 
695 (Utah App. 1989). Bear River did not plead its "fairly debatable" affirmative 
defense. (R. 11-18). 
A party may not present an affirmative defense for the first time on a motion. See 
Creekview Apts. 771 P.2d at 694. Defendant's assertion that it owed only a "fairly 
debatable" duty to provide PIP benefits to Mr. Prince is an affirmative defense. All 
affirmative defenses must be raised in pleadings. Pleadings "necessarily exclude 
motions." Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon. 770 P.2d 1009,1010 (Utah App. 1989). 
Therefore, Judge Thome's adoption of Bear River's conclusion that its conduct was 
"fairly debatable" must be reversed because it was waived by not being pled. 
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VI. BEAR RIVER'S FAILURE TO PAY PLAINTIFF'S PIP 
BENEFITS BASED UPON NOTHING MORE THAN THE 
INSURANCE DOCTOR'S OPINION VIOLATED ITS DUTY OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Bear River refused to provide PIP benefits to Plaintiff based upon its insurance 
doctor's assertions that more than 12 weeks of treatment was not "medically necessary." 
(R. 190). Bear River also admitted that it refused to provide PIP benefits because it 
feared that the tortfeasor's insurer would not reimburse it pursuant to Section 309(6) for 
more than the amounts recommended by the insurance doctor. (R. 71). Bear River also 
asserted that if it paid all of Plaintiff s PIP benefits, his premiums would go up. (R. 71). 
The general rule of strict enforcement of duties of good faith and fair dealing was 
adopted in Beck when the Utah Supreme Court stated: "the state of mind of the insurer is 
irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the covenant of good faith implied in an 
insurance contract can substantially harm the insured and warrants a remedy." Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Therefore, Bear River's mere 
assertion that it really, really, really believed that it could rely on the insurance doctor 
does not transform its ignorance into good faith or render its bad faith "fairly debatable." 
The Court has adopted the fairly debatable defense. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
Co.. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996) (holding that the covenant of good faith imposes the 
requirement "that insurers act reasonably, as an objective matter, in dealing with their 
insureds."). In Billings, the Utah Supreme Court held that the fairly debatable defense 
allows the insurer to present evidence that it dealt with its insured in an objectively 
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reasonable manner. Id. at n.2. 
Bear River has failed to present any such evidence. Instead it presented the second 
opinion of the insurance doctor and exclaimed "accordingly" Bear River discontinued 
payment. (R. 148). Instead of analyzing its right to exclusively rely on its insurance 
doctor for a coverage opinion (i.e., a legal opinion), Bear River simply asserted the "fact" 
that its insurance doctor's second opinion gave it a "clear debatable reason for denial of 
plaintiff s benefits." (R. 148). But see State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750. 756 (Utah App.). 
cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses' 
testimony to which [plaintiff] objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the 
witnesses tie their opinions to the requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has 
established error and that this error should have been obvious to the court."). 
1. Defendant's Conduct Did Not Satisfy the Beck At-The-Very-Least Test. 
Defendant concluded (without analysis or evidence) that "evidence establishes" 
that it properly discharged its contractual obligations under the Beck at-the-very-least test 
which it quotes. (R. 145). 
The implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at 
the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to 
enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate 
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim. 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see also 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996) (quoting same 
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language and inserting similar emphasis). 
The fairly debatable defense allows Defendant to attempt to persuade the fact 
finder that its conduct was objectively reasonable. In its attempt to so persuade, Bear 
River instead simply concluded its conduct was reasonable. (R. 145-148). Then it quoted 
from the report of its insurance doctor. Id. Both the assertion of a conclusion and the 
recitation of an inadmissible opinion are insufficient to satisfy the "fairly debatable" 
defense. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Prince's claim was valid. Neither Defendant nor its 
doctor has disputed that Mr. Prince's claim was "valid," it only argued that the expenses 
were not "reasonable and necessary" because its doctor labeled certain treatments as "not 
medically necessary." This Court will not interpret the no-fault statute's use of the 
commonly-understood term "necessary" to limit PIP benefits based upon the supercilious 
use of the term "medically necessary" by Defendant's insurance doctor. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 68-3-11 ("Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language . . . .") 
Moreover, Defendant's investigation was not "diligent." It cut off Mr. Prince's 
PIP benefits retroactively long after the out-of-pocket expenses were incurred, and it 
scolded Mr. Prince for continuing his doctor-ordered treatments instead of waiting for the 
results and interpretation of its doctor's report. (R. 55). Defendant did not act 
"reasonably" by relying on its insurance doctor's legal opinion to the exclusion of all 
other evidence, or by making its coverage decision based upon the feared assertions to be 
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made by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. Defendant did not act reasonably by 
threatening that Mr. Prince's premiums would go up if it paid the sums that it had 
promised to pay. Defendant did not "fairly evaluate" Mr. Prince's claim when it ignored 
the unambiguous requirements of the no-fault statute. It did not act "reasonably" in 
refusing understand its obligations and refusing to read the plain language of the no-fault 
statute. And its refusal to pay Plaintiffs PIP benefits for several years when its actions 
were required within 30 days was hardly "prompt" compliance with the contract. 
Judge Thome's conclusion that Bear River's actions were "fairly debatable" as a 
matter of law must be reversed. Bear River's actions constituted the breach of its duties 
of good faith and fair dealing, as a matter of law. It misrepresented its obligations and the 
insured's rights, it failed to fairly evaluate the facts. It failed to act promptly or 
reasonably. And its bad faith continued through this litigation by and through the 
assertions made by its attorneys. 
VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PIP CARRIER AND ITS 
INSUREDS IS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP GIVING 
RISE TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES WHICH GIVES RISE TO A 
CLAIM FOR THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH. 
"The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality 
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties 
over the other." Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). Bear River 
promised to pay to medical providers "all expenses" incurred by the insured for medical 
treatment subject only to the coverage limits purchased and the "reasonable value" of the 
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expenses. 
Bear River expressly promised to defend Plaintiff for its decision to refuse to 
provide PIP benefits to him. (R. 112 at f 5). In addition to the fact that Plaintiffs PIP 
coverage included Bear River's duty to defend, PIP coverage, like the duty to defend, is 
effectively a part of liability coverage. 
While no-fault coverages are, in fact, first-party benefits payable to 
the injured party by his or her own insurance company, this 
insurance clearly is intended to replace or augment automobile 
liability insurance.... 
Couch on Insurance 3d, § 125:2. Therefore, Bear River's mere assertion that PIP benefits 
(like the duty to defend) are generally in the nature of first-party coverage fails to shed 
any light on the question of whether its bad faith in connection with refusing to pay PIP 
benefits gives rise to third-party bad faith.38 
While Bear River insisted that its insurance doctor's "medical decisions" create its 
right to review medical questions; in point of fact, this case does not raise "medical" 
issues at all — it raises "contractual" issues. Although Plaintiffs' injuries are the 
offspring of automobile accidents (which prior to the adoption of the no-fault statute 
would have implied the utilization of Bear River's tort-based analysis), this fact does not 
38
 This Court's decision in Beck was explained in detail in subsequent cases 
involving wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Based upon the Court's 
reasoning in those cases, Plaintiffs complaint phrased part of its allegation of third-party 
bad faith (5th cause of action) as "Tort of Violation of Public Policy Embodied in the No-
fault Insurance Act" in order to avoid the confusion surrounding the terms "first-party" 
and "third-party" in addition to a generalized allegation of bad faith (2nd cause of action). 
Unfortunately, the naive attempt to avoid confusion actually spawned greater confusion. 
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permit Bear River to impose its "brain children"39 on its insureds. 
Bear River implemented an undisclosed medical cost containment program (the 
purpose of which is to provide an annual windfall to Bear River measured in millions of 
dollars) in lieu of honoring its promise to indemnify its insureds for their expenses. Bear 
River presented its doctor's arguments as "independent" medical opinions. Its use of this 
misleading nomenclature leads average purchasers of insurance to believe that the 
insurance doctor is the equivalent of their doctor (or, at least, insureds do not understand 
that the insurance doctor is contractually obligated to help the insurance company save 
money and does not perform any "medical" role at all). Plaintiffs do not allege complete 
silence, but half-truths and concealment.40 Bear River's failure to disclose its cost 
containment programs, to disclose the meaning, if any, of its "reasonable and necessary" 
slogan, or to explicitly warn its insureds that it would substitute its doctors' opinions41 for 
the opinions of the insureds' treating doctors as the sole basis for its denial of the 
insureds' claims violated Plaintiffs' trust and reliance on Defendant's perceived special 
39
 Andrew v. Ideal National Ins. Co.. 509 P.2d 367 (Utah 1973) (acknowledging, 
sarcastically, that unilateral self-serving conclusions made by one party to a contract to 
determine the terms and conditions thereof would be a "good, economic business 
practice, if possible and enforceable"). 
40
 For example, Bear River's insurance doctors are "independent" of their 
physician-patient duties and their hippocratic oaths. Bear River's characterization is not 
wholly false, just incredibly misleading. 
41
 See Beaver County v. Home Indem. Co.. 52 P.2d 435 (Utah 1935) ("a trustee, 
whether public officer, receiver, guardian, or other fiduciary, who contracts to surrender 
his control to another [such as an insurance doctor], has made a promise contrary to 
public policy") (citations omitted). 
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knowledge42 of the insurance industry. 
Bear River is also Plaintiffs' agent and owes fiduciary duties43 to them with respect 
to PIP coverage. 
Wholly apart from the contractual obligations undertaken by the 
parties, the law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to 
their principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of 
their agency. 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted) (analyzing Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 
1967)). Bear River was obligated to pay the third-party medical providers directly.44 
And, of course, an agent such as Bear River may not enrich itself at the expense of its 
42
 Bear River argued that Plaintiff had "no standing" to sue Bear River for bad 
faith. (R. 97). "Standing" has absolutely nothing to do with this case. Bear River's 
assertion is appalling. 
43
 The district court and Bear River were both confused by the "first-party" and 
"third-party" nomenclature as used by this Court in its bad-faith jurisprudence. Bear 
River asserted that insurers are "accordingly" only liable for "first-party" bad faith 
because PIP coverage is "first-party" coverage. (R. 97-98). Bad faith denial of PIP 
claims is "third-party" bad faith arising from a first-party contract (the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing only exists between parties to a contract — i.e., it does not extend to 
third-party claimants). See, e^g., Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746 
(Utah App. 1991). The "third-party" bad faith distinction relates to the obligations owed 
by the insured (i.e., the insurer which "steps in the shoes" of the insured and is obligated 
to indemnify the insured) to third-parties (such as medical providers) because the 
insurer's obligation is to protect its insured from claims made against the insured by third-
parties and because PIP coverage gives rise to a confidential relationship. Liability 
coverage (a first-party contract, but third-party coverage) and litigation coverage (a first-
party contract and first-party coverage) are the two types of coverage acknowledged to 
give rise to a "third-party" bad faith claim. PIP coverage is the third. 
44
 PIP medical expenses are almost always paid directly to the medical providers. 
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principals, such as the members of the proposed Class, or fail to disclose the standards 
underlying the non-performance of its duties. This is not a new concept: 
"The employee is duty bound not to act in antagonism or opposition 
to the interests of the employer. Everyone-whether designated 
agent, trustee, servant, or what not — who is under contract or other 
legal obligation to represent or act for another in any particular 
business or line of business or for any valuable purpose must be 
loyal and faithful to the interest of such other in respect to such 
business or purpose. He cannot lawfully serve or acquire any 
private interest of his own in opposition to it. This is a rule of 
common sense and honesty as well as of law. The agent is not 
entitled to avail himself of any advantage that his position may give 
him to profit beyond the agreed compensation for his services. He 
may not speculate for his gain in the subject-matter of the 
employment. He may not use information that he may have acquired 
by reason of his employment either for the purpose of acquiring 
property or doing any other act which is in opposition to his 
principal's interests. He will be required to account to his 
employer or principal for any gift, gratuity, or benefit received 
by him in violation of his duty, or any interest acquired adverse 
to his principal without a full disclosure, though it does not appear 
that the principal has suffered any actual loss by fraud or otherwise." 
Tatsuno v. Kasai. 259 P. 318 (Utah 1927) (quoting 21 R. C. L. p. 825, under the title 
"Principal and Agent," § 10) (emphasis added). Rather than encouraging Bear River to 
impose a second injury on its insureds, the Court should provide it with "every incentive 
to treat the insured properly in the first instance." Campbell v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co.. 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). 
Bear River's breach of its duties of good faith and fair dealing arising from a PIP 
contract subjects it to third-party bad faith. Judge Thome's Order must be reversed. 
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VIII. BEAR RIVER IS PRESUMED TO HAVE COMMITTED FRAUD, 
AND ITS UNSUPPORTED "NO EVIDENCE" MOTION WAS 
FRIVOLOUS. 
Fiduciaries who breach their obligations or fail to disclose their misconduct to their 
beneficiaries are presumed to have committed fraud: "If the representations were untrue 
and known to be untrue [or recklessly not recognized as being untrue], the fraudulent 
intent is presumed." Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.. 75 P.2d 
669 (Utah 1938). "Where representations have been made in regard to a material matter 
and action has been taken, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, it will be 
presumed that representations were relied upon." Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n 
Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983). 
After careful study and consideration we conclude that this 
presumption shifts the burden onto the confidential adviser of 
persuading or convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of the 
evidence that no fraud or undue influence was exerted, or in other 
words, he has the burden of convincing the fact finder from the 
evidence that it is more probable that he acted perfectly fair with 
his confidant; that he made complete disclosure of all material 
information available and took no unfair advantage of his superior 
position than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to obtain the 
benefits in question. 
Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956). As a fiduciary that 
asserts its right to look after its own financial well-being at the expense of its insureds, 
Bear River bears the burden of persuasion, and the Court has a duty to reign in the 
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industry's mischief.45 
Bear River recited the nine elements of fraud, and baldly proclaimed that Plaintiff 
failed to plead fraud with particularity. (R. 150). Defendant failed to demonstrate (or 
even assert) which factor of fraud it believed was missing, or to otherwise explain how 
Mr. Prince's Complaint was "accordingly" deficient. 
Instead, Defendant baldly asserted in its reply memorandum46 that it did not have 
any evidence that Mr. Prince relied on Defendant's fraud or that he was injured by such 
reliance. (R. 171). Bear River had no evidence of its own misconduct because it 
intentionally closed its eyes,47 and it had no evidence of reliance because it refused to 
conduct any discovery. Placing the burden of proof on the non-moving party would 
effectively treat Rule 56 as a discovery technique. But see. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 
P.2d 663, 668 (Utah 1985) ("The functions of issue-formation and fact-revelation are 
appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process."). Judge Thome ignored the plain 
45
 "And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as 
shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and 
evasions for continuance of the mischief,... and to add force and life to the cure and 
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the a c t . . . . " Masich v. United 
States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (1948) (citation omitted). 
46
 A party may not attempt to support conclusory assertions made in the opening 
argument by presenting marginally better assertions in a reply memorandum. See U.P.C.. 
Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc.. 1999 UT App 303, ffif 62-64, 990 P.2d 945. 
47
 Bear River's confidential relationship with its insureds required it to refrain 
from "the deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that inquiry 
would disclose a vice or defect in the transaction, — that is to say, where there is an 
intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears." Research Planning Inc. v. Bank of 
Utah. 690 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1984). 
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language of Rule 56 and every opinion ever written by this Court. Instead of obeying the 
law, the district court adopted Bear River's mere assertion that Plaintiff "failed to supply . 
.. evidence . . . of fraud" in response to Bear River's "no evidence" motion. (R. 172). 
The assertion that a defendant may make an unsupported motion for summary 
judgment early in litigation and thereby force the plaintiff to present all facts and legal 
arguments necessary to prove his case or else have the allegations dismissed is absolutely 
foolish and asinine. It is true that, where a party submits a properly supported motion, the 
opponent to a summary judgment motion must "set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
However, that burden is triggered only when "a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in" Rule 56(e). Id. (emphasis added). "Unless the 
moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no obligation to 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433,445 
(Utah 1996) (quoting K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994) (emphasis 
added)). 
The foregoing rule is implicit in and compelled by the language of Rule 56: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added); see also Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 
P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) ("The party moving for summary judgment must establish a 
right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue 
of fact"). 
A party that chooses to file an unsupported motion for summary judgment may not 
impose any burdens on the responding party. In response to an unsupported motion, the 
non-moving party may rely on his pleadings and "is under no obligation to demonstrate 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 
1994) (citing Rule 56(e) and Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 
1994)); see also Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041,1045 (Utah 1984); Parrish v. Lavton City 
Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086,1087 (Utah 1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that: 
If the [requirements of the rules] are not fulfilled, both in letter and 
spirit, the summary judgment procedure may become a vehicle of 
injustice rather than a salutary medium of reaching a swift but just 
result on a pure matter of law, as intended by the framers of the 
rules. 
Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) (quoting Cleveland Trust Co. v. 
Foster. 93 So. 2d 112,114 (Fla. 1957)). 
A party may never file a motion for summary judgment based upon the mere 
assertion that there is "no evidence" to support the opposing position and thereby shift the 
burden of persuasion to the non-moving party. Parties filing such frivolous "no evidence" 
motions generally rely upon the United States Supreme Court's decision known as 
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Celotex (which does not support the concept of a "no evidence" motion) which is not 
binding on this Court. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433 at n. 13 (Utah 1996) ("This court 
has not previously adopted the reasoning of the majority opinion in Celotex, which is not 
binding on us as a matter of law, and declines to do so today."); see also Langeland v. 
Monarch Motors. Inc.. 952 P.2d 1058 at n. 4 (Utah 1998) ("While federal cases are 
instructive, and perhaps even persuasive, they are by no means authoritative and certainly 
not controlling."). 
To summarize: First, "[inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment." D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1989). Second, unless the moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence 
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the party opposing the motion 
is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." K&T. Inc. v. 
Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
[0]nce the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to 
prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the 
existence of one of the elements of the cause of action, the 
nonmoving party then bears the burden of 'providing] some 
evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential 
elements of his [or her] claim.' 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (quoting Thavne v. Beneficial 
Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120,124 (Utah 1994)) (emphasis added). 
However, before determining whether the nonmoving party has met 
its burden, the court hearing the motion for summary judgment must 
be satisfied that the moving party has met its burden of proving that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
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party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e). 
Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). 
Third, "'[a] single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact.'" See Apache 
Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (quoting 
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170,1172 (Utah 1983)). Fourth, summary judgment 
procedure is a drastic remedy, requiring strict compliance with the rule authorizing it. 
Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). Fifth, in cases involving the 
interpretation of a document or an agreement, "it is not appropriate for a court to weigh 
disputed evidence concerning such factors; the sole inquiry to be determined is whether 
there is a material issue of fact to be decided.... It is of no moment that the evidence on 
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling,... documentary evidence is not 
dispositive if the intent and purpose underlying the documents are at issue." W. M. 
Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co.. 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981). 
Bear River and Judge Thome grossly distorted Rule 56. Judge Thome's Order 
must be reversed. 
IX. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WERE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED. 
Bear River moved for a summary judgment based on vouching for its own 
arguments. (R. 149). Bear River's boot-strapping conclusions that "reasonable and 
necessary" is a "recognized standard" did not entitle it to a summary judgment. 
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Based on nothing more substantial than the inarticulate legal opinion of its 
insurance doctor, Bear River concluded (without reasoning) that "[tjhere is no evidence 
whatsoever that Bear River's conduct could be considered outrageous." (R. 149). 
Imposing "standards" which are not set forth in the contract, imposing "standards" which 
are not authorized by the no-fault statute, relying on an "independent" doctor to the 
exclusion of all other facts, acting as a fiduciary who puts its own interests ahead of the 
interests of its beneficiary are "outrageous" actions. Bear River's mere assertion to the 
contrary did not entitle it to a summary judgment. Judge Thome's Order must be 
reversed. 
X. JUDGE DEVER ERRED BY REFUSING TO OVERTURN JUDGE 
THORNE'S ORDER. 
While it is true that Judge Dever had broad discretion in connection with his 
refusal to overturn Judge Thome's Order, it is also true that a judge's primary obligation 
is to find the truth. Rule 54(b) allows "a [trial] court to change its position with respect to 
any order or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case." Trembly v. 
Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306,1310 n.2 (Utah App. 1994): accord Timm v. 
Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993) (explaining that appellate courts "will not 
disturb [the trial court's] ruling absent an abuse of discretion."). 
It is axiomatic that the trial courts have no discretion to re-write a statute to make it 
conform to a party's desires; rather the court must interpret the statute as written. Judge 
Thome, as explained in more detail above, refused to give effect to the plain language of 
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the no-fault statute. This Court will review that Order for correctness. 
Judge Dever's refusal to reverse that ruling, on the other hand, was an abuse of his 
discretion. A judge's discretion cannot be used in contravention of the ends of justice. 
Justice demands proper interpretation of statutes especially where a party's substantial 
rights would be extinguished by the rote adherence to a prior judge's erroneous Order. 
Moreover, justice requires speedy and inexpensive determinations of legal questions, and 
forcing the Plaintiff to appeal Judge Thome's decision before obtaining relief from his 
Order unnecessarily delayed Plaintiffs right of relief. See, e.g.. Utah R. Civ. P. 1. 
XL JUDGE DEVER ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMIT 
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
Rule 15 directs that "leave shall be freely given" to a party to amend its pleading 
"when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). In this case, justice required that leave 
be given to amend Plaintiffs complaint to add Dr. Marble as a defendant because, he is 
an indispensable party. Utah R. Civ. P. 19 (stating that "the court shall order" that 
indispensable parties be joined). The only bases upon which "[ajppellate courts uphold a 
trial court's denial of a motion to amend [are] if the amendment is sought late in the 
course of litigation, if the movant was aware of the facts underlying the proposed 
amendment long before its filing, and if there is no adequate explanation for the delay." 
Swift Stop. Inc. v. Wight. 845 P.2d 250,253 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis added). While 
Plaintiffs motion was filed late in the course of the original litigation, and many of the 
facts were known, Plaintiff did provide an adequate explanation for the delay. (R. 418). 
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Bear River constantly misrepresented the facts and the law, and approximately six 
different district court judges (in other cases) all refused to interpret the no-fault statute 
because the sums at issue were so small and because the courts believed that Bear River's 
assertions were consistent with the status quo.** Moreover, Judge Thome's conclusion 
that an insurance doctor's legal conclusion creates a question of fact that can only be 
resolved by a jury creates an impossible and uneconomic hurdle for any insured who is 
denied PIP benefits. These procedural49 and substantive50 facts were sufficient to explain 
the delay. Because there was sufficient explanation, Judge Dever's denial of Plaintiff s 
motion to amend was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 
48
 District court judges have frequently complained that since the amounts at issue 
are so small, the cases should be filed in small claims court. If there were any real judge 
who would interpret the no-fault statute, the parties could know their obligations and the 
burdens of proof. Until that happens, litigation in front of real judges is plenty frustrating 
because the status quo is elevated over the plain language of the statute. Subjecting 
litigants to small claims court and its part-time volunteers (usually transactional 
attorneys) without any guidelines would be a complete mockery of justice. 
49
 Bear River made the ridiculous assertion that Plaintiff was trying to "revive the 
dismissed causes of action" through the amendment of the complaint. (R. 392). Causes 
of action cannot be "revived" through an amendment. Plaintiff sought to have Judge 
Thome's Order reversed through its motion for a new trial, and the revised pleading 
would merely expand the scope of the litigation to properly ensure that the victims of 
Bear River's insurance fraud and criminal theft can eventually be made whole. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. §76-6-521. 
50
 The opinion from the Third Circuit offered additional support for the 
propositions being pursued by Plaintiff. See Sullivan v. Barnett 139 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 
1998). 
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XII. JUDGE DEVER'S REFUSAL TO AWARD REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Bear River's counsel repeatedly misrepresented procedural and substantive facts to 
the district court regarding the nature and amount of effort expended for the breach of 
contract cause of action. The district court apparently relied upon the misstatements 
submitted by Bear River's counsel. (R. 268). The district court failed to issue findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, hold an evidentiary hearing, or provide any additional 
explanation for its conclusion. (R. 527). 
Therefore, Plaintiff is under no burden to marshal evidence in support of the 
court's ruling. Anderson v. Poms. 1999 UT App 207,110, 984 P.2d 392. Moreover, the 
only "fact" that is supportive of what appears to have been Judge Dever's reasoning was 
Bear River's misrepresentation that the efforts exerted in connection with the breach of 
contract claim only consisted of filing the complaint. Therefore, the basis of Judge 
Dever's ruling is hardly composed of "facts" which must be marshaled. 
Bear River's counsel repeatedly insisted that the only effort expended by 
Plaintiffs counsel for the breach of contract issue was filing the complaint. See, e,g., (R. 
230, 247, 276-79, 510). Based upon this bald and incorrect assertion, the district court 
limited the award of attorney fees to three hours. (R. 526). Bear River never did explain 
how the debate as to the scope of its contractual obligations did not relate to its breach of 
contract; instead, this frivolous assertion, like nearly every argument ever made by Bear 
River and its counsel, was simply asserted. (R. 268). 
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Plaintiff repeatedly asked Judge Thorne and Judge Dever to interpret the statutory 
contract. As explained above, the determination of whether a party breached a contract 
cannot be determined until it is determined what the contract says. This seems too 
obvious to admit of serious controversy. 
Plaintiff repeatedly asked the court to determine the scope of coverage and the 
procedures giving rise to the substantive right of reimbursement for out-of-pocket 
expenses. Bear River's mere assertion that interpreting a contract has nothing to do with 
determining the question of a breach of contract can only be characterized as 
incompetent, misleading and frivolous. 
The terms of the contract determine the rights and obligations of the parties. The 
district court refused to interpret the contract, and permitted itself to be misled by Bear 
River's attorneys.51 Moreover, all efforts expended to counter the bald assertions of Bear 
River's counsel is also grounds for recovering attorney fees. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford 
Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 90,119, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the 
black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This 
obligation to properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel 
make in litigation."). 
Plaintiffs counsel submitted an affidavit for attorney fees which only addressed 
51
 In an apparent attempt to distract the court from their misconduct, Bear River's 
attorneys took the extraordinary step of attempting to intimidate Plaintiffs attorney by 
filing an equally-frivolous Rule 11 motion which the trial court, properly, ignored. 
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the attorney fees expended up to the point of Judge Thome's Order.52 This affidavit was 
not opposed by any competent reasoning or any competent counter-affidavit. See Freed 
Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975) (attorney fees may be 
awarded on summary judgment if the record contains a stipulation, an unrebutted 
affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award); South Sanpitch Co. v. 
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988) (uncontroverted testimony concerning amount of 
reasonable fee provides adequate basis for fee award). Therefore, the Court should award 
the attorney fees supported by the affidavit, and remand for a full determination of all fees 
incurred and all other damages suffered. 
Moreover, the question of what efforts were expended for which causes of action 
is irrelevant. The black-letter standard is that a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded 
"all attorney fees reasonably incurred in the litigation." Dejavue. Inc. v. U.S. Energy 
Corp., 1999 UT App. 355, f 20, 993 P.2d 222 (addressing the analogous situation of a 
plaintiff bringing multiple claims "involving a common core of facts and related legal 
theories" and prevailing on only some of them) (emphasis added). Each and every 
52
 Judge Dever stated that he would only award attorney fees in required to litigate 
the breach of contract cause of action (implicitly through Judge Thome's Order and 
alleged payment by Bear River). Based upon the district court's statement, Plaintiff 
allocated those fees which sought a correct interpretation of the no-fault statute up until 
Judge Thome's Order. See Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 1999 UT App 109, ^  15, 
978 P.2d 470 (holding that an allocation is sufficient if the "substance of the process . . . 
[results in] separating recoverable from non-recoverable fees."). The arbitrary cut-off 
point of the date Bear River finally allegedly paid the PIP benefits it owed to Plaintiff is 
incorrect, and this case should be remanded to consider all the attorney fees which were 
required to force Bear River to acknowledge its contractual obligations. 
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question presented by this litigation relies on a proper interpretation of the no-fault 
statute. Because the proper interpretation of the no-fault statute is at the heart of every 
cause of action, it cannot be disputed that there is significant overlap. This overlap is 
sufficient to award attorney fees for each and every hour expended by Plaintiffs counsel 
in connection with this litigation because Bear River's breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, 
and breach of fiduciary duty all arose out of its misrepresentation of the contractual terms. 
XIII. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL ATTORNEY 
FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL. 
Appellate courts routinely allow attorney fees on appeal when contracts and/or 
statutes expressly provide for fees. See Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 227 (Utah App. 
1991). Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney fees expended for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's order should be reversed in its entirety. Judgment should be 
entered in favor of Plaintiff stating that Bear River breached its contract, acted in bad 
faith by misrepresenting the terms and conditions of its contract, owes fiduciary duties 
under its PIP coverage, and it may not raise any defenses to its contractual obligation to 
pay PIP benefits (other than fraud or bad faith) which are not clearly and explicitly set 
forth in the no-fault statute. Bear River's unlawful claims adjustment techniques, its 
misrepresentations, and its failure to give notice of its actions to its insureds constituted 
breach of contract, third-party bad faith, and fraud. Because this case does not raise 
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individualized medical issues, the district court should be instructed to permit amendment 
of the complaint and certify this case as a class action on remand. Trial should then be 
had as to damages to Plaintiff and the members of the prospective Class. 
Attorney fees should be awarded by this Court in full pursuant to the affidavit of 
attorney fees submitted to the district court. The Court should rule, as a matter of law, 
that the hours and rates were reasonable and necessary. The district court, on remand, 
should then address all attorney fees incurred in connection with this case so far, and 
award prospective attorney fees monthly as those fees are incurred. 
DATED t h i s ^ / C ^ d a y of September, 2001. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 7 day of September, 2001, a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiff's Appeal Brief was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Mr. Mr. Joseph J. Joyce 
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARRETT PRINCE, 
) ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ) 
CO., ) Civil No. 970905641CV 
Defendant. ) Judge William A. Thorne 
This court, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, having reviewed the memoranda 
submitted by the parties, and after hearing oral argument on February 9, 1998, wherein Trent 
Waddoups appeared for the plaintiff, Garrett Prince, and Kristin VanOrman appeared on behalf 
of Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, has duly considered both plaintiffs and defendant's 
motions for summary judgment, together with all supporting memoranda, the court being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
i njrrj JucMrifc' ~ ••-•••jet 
APR I 1998 
De/Juty/Cierk ^iftyT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Garrett Prince was at all times relevant herein an insured of Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Company. 
2. On May 12, 1997, Mr. Prince was involved in an automobile accident. 
3. After the subject accident, Mr. Prince submitted claims for PIP benefits to Bear 
River Mutual. 
4. Bear River hired Dr. Stephen Marble to perform an "independent medical 
evaluation" of Mr. Prince. 
5. Dr. Marble concluded that the chiropractic care exceeding 12 weeks of treatment 
was not medically necessary, and recommended that Mr. Prince cease chiropractic treatment. 
6. After receiving Dr. Marble's report, Bear River discontinued payment of PIP 
benefits except for the first 12 weeks of treatment. 
7. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a court's ruling in his 
favor regarding his claims of breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
and tortious breach of fiduciary obligations. 
8. Defendant opposed plaintiffs summary judgment motion, and filed its own 
motion for partial summary judgment seeking the dismissal of plaintiff s claims for bad faith, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, tortious violation of public policy, as well as all 
punitive damage claims. 
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9. After defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff provided no evidence, 
through affidavits or otherwise, to support his claims for emotional distress, fraud, or the tort of 
violation of public policy. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 provides that PIP coverage and benefits include the 
"reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, 
including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of 
$3,000 per person." U.C.A. §31 A-22-307. Section 31 A-22-307 therefore imposes a "reasonable 
and necessary" standard for determining the payment of PIP benefits. This reasonable and 
necessary standard does not need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Legislature has 
used the term advisedly and the plaintiff must prove "necessary" by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Further, the term "necessary" means something more than nonfraudulent claims. 
Further, a claim by an insured against his/her insurer for the payment of PIP benefits is a 
claim which is first-party in nature. Unlike a third-party situation, where the insurer contracts 
to defend the insured against claims made by third parties against the insured and to pay 
any resulting liability, up to the specified dollar limit, a first-party situation does not 
involve a fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured. Accordingly, tort 
claims are not available in the first-party context. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
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Further, when a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the 
debate concerns a matter of fact or law. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 
(Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals held that there can be no first-party insurance bad 
faith, as a matter of law, if the claim is fairly debatable. Plaintiffs claims in this matter were 
fairly debatable as a matter of law. 
Further, pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when a motion for 
summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a general issue for trial. The moving party on a motion 
for summary judgment need not support his motion with affidavits. 
Accordingly, this court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees that plaintiff Garrett Prince's 
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. This court further orders that defendant Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. This court 
further orders that plaintiffs claims for bad faith, infliction of emotional distress, fraud, the tort 
of violation of public policy, and all claims for punitive damages filed against Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Company are hereby dismissed with prejudice. These judgments are final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). 
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So ordered this ^J day of / ^ A ^ , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
William 
District 
Trent J^^addoups, Esq. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Order 980220 
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CAJRR & WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
GARRETT PRINCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant. 
FINAL ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9 7 0 9 0 5 6 4 1 CV 
Judge L.A. Dever 
The Court having ruled that Defendant is liable for costs, compound interest, and 
attorney fees and that all other issues raised by the parties are finalized: 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Garrett Prince be, and hereby is, 
awarded JUDGMENT against Defendant Bear River Mutual Insurance Company in the sum 
of: 
$262.15 
•& 0ZZ.& 
Accrued Pre-judgment Normal Interest at 114% per Month 
Reasonable Attorney Fees 
Accrued Costs to Date of Judgment 
JUDGMENT 
With interest on this Judgment accruing at the rate of 7.657% per annum as provided by law 
from the date of this Judgment until paid. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Judgment shall be augmented in the 
amount of reasonable costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said Judgment by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this '[A day of $5ffl& 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
H6nor^ 
DIST 
JUDGMENT DEBTORS ADDRESS: 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
% Attorneys for Defendant 
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this JL% day of jlatwry, ^601, to: 
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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